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ABSTRACT
Since 2000, premiums for employer-provided health insurance have increased by 59 percent with
little corresponding increase in the generosity of coverage. The effect of this increase in costs on
wages and employment will depend on workers' valuation of the benefit, the elasticities of labor
supply and demand, and institutional constraints on employers' ability to lower wages. Measuring
these effects is difficult, however, without a source of exogenous variation in the cost of benefits.
We use variation in medical malpractice payments driven by the recent "medical malpractice crisis"
to identify the causal effect of rising health insurance premiums on wages, employment, and health
insurance coverage. We estimate that a 10 percent increase in health insurance premiums reduces
the aggregate probability of being employed by 1.6 percent and hours worked by 1 percent, and
increases the likelihood that a worker is employed only part-time by 1.9 percent. For workers
covered by employer provided health insurance, this increase in premiums results in an offsetting
decrease in wages of 2.3 percent. Thus, rising health insurance premiums may both increase the
ranks of the unemployed and place an increasing burden on workers through decreased wages for
workers with employer health insurance and decreased hours for workers moved from full time jobs














achandra@dartmouth.eduI.  INTRODUCTION  
In the United States, two-thirds of the non-elderly population is covered by employer-
provided health insurance (EHI), either directly or as a dependent through a family member’s 
coverage.
1  According to a national survey conducted by the Kaiser Family Foundation, the cost 
of EHI has increased by over 59 percent since 2000 with no accompanying increase in the scale 
or scope of benefits; between 2003 and 2004 the price of premiums increased 11.2 percent, a 
nine percentage point increase over the 2.3 percent increase in workers’ hourly earnings.
2  
Increases in health insurance premiums may have significant effects on labor markets, including 
changes in the number of jobs, hours worked per employee, wages, and compensation packages. 
Indeed, it is possible that a significant portion of the increase in the uninsured population may be 
a consequence of employers shedding this benefit as health-insurance premiums rise (Porter, 
2004).  Simple correlations are consistent with this mechanism: despite strong economic growth 
in the 1990s, the number of non-elderly uninsured grew by 3 percentage points to 15.7 percent of 
the population, while the price of health-insurance premiums grew by 34 percent. 
Understanding how labor market characteristics affect adjustments to increased health 
insurance costs is of growing policy importance.  Proposals to cover the uninsured often rely on 
“employer mandates” that would require employers to cover eligible workers.
3 For example, 
California’s Senate Bill 2 (also known as Proposition 72, narrowly defeated in November, 2004) 
would have required all employers with more than 20 employees  to provide health insurance to 
their workers (who work more than 100 hours per month.  Other policy proposals include the 
provision of tax credits for the purchase of non-group health insurance, differentially changing 
                                                 
1 These tabulations are from the Annual Demographic Files of the Current Population Survey (CPS) for 
1988-2003. We define the non-elderly population as those under the age of 65.  
2 These figures are obtained from Kaiser Family Foundation (2003). In Figure 1 we use these data to 
illustrate the growth of premiums since 1996 for family and single-person policies. 
3 Yelowitz (2004) provides a thorough discussion of this legislation and estimates its economic impact. 
   1 eligible employees’ valuation of benefits provided by their employer versus wages.  
The magnitude of the effects of increases in benefit costs on employment, wages, and 
health insurance coverage will be driven by the elasticities of labor supply and demand, 
institutional constraints on wages and compensation packages, and how much workers value the 
increase in health insurance costs.  Since employers currently provide such coverage voluntarily, 
if workers fully value these benefits then they will bear the cost of the increase in reduced wages, 
with no accompanying change in employment, employment costs, or employee utility.
4  In a 
world where workers value benefits at their cost and are able to sort between firms based on their 
preferences, and without other institutional constraints, increases in the costs of benefits should 
be fully offset by decreases in wages. 
There are many reasons to believe that firms are limited in their ability to offset increases 
in the price of health insurance premiums through lower compensation.  Institutional constraints 
(such as the minimum wage or IRS non-discriminatory provisions that limit the extent to which 
employers can offer differential benefits to their employees) limit a firm’s ability to reduce 
compensation. For these reasons, increases in the cost of providing health insurance may not be 
neutral in terms of their effects on employment and the structure of work. However, identifying 
the magnitude of these effects is difficult. Data on premiums and wages are usually not jointly 
available at the individual level.  Additionally, most micro-datasets (such as the SIPP and CPS) 
do not allow the researcher to control adequately for worker characteristics, such as ability, that 
might simultaneously influence the outcome under study.  In this paper we uncover the causal 
                                                 
4 This view is explicitly studied in the literature estimating the wage-fringe tradeoff.  A $1 increase in the 
value of fringes may offset by a $1 reduction in fringe benefits – or, in the case of most tax-favored 
benefits, a $1/(1-t) reduction, where t is the tax rate.  For example, Gruber (1994) demonstrates that the 
passage of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act in 1978 (that mandated that pregnancies no longer be 
treated as a “comparable illness”) resulted in employers shifting the entire cost of the mandate onto 
employees. 
2   effect of increases in the cost of benefits on labor market outcomes by exploiting an exogenous 
source of variation in the cost of providing health insurance:  the recent “medical malpractice 
crisis” where malpractice costs for physicians grew dramatically in some states but not in others.  
As we discuss in more detail below, the growth of malpractice payments affects both malpractice 
insurance premiums and the cost of health insurance: if the demand for health care is relatively 
inelastic (because of health insurance or public insurance programs), the increased cost of 
malpractice will be borne by consumers in the form of higher health insurance premiums, rather 
than primarily by physicians in the form of lower compensation (see Baicker and Chandra, 
2005).  
  We use malpractice payments as an instrument for health insurance premiums in order to 
examine the effect of health insurance premiums on employment patterns, earnings, and health 
insurance coverage.  We find that the cost of increases in health insurance premiums is borne by 
workers through decreased wages (for those with employer health insurance) and by decreased 
hours for those moved from full time jobs with benefits to part time jobs without.  These results 
have strong implications for the distributional impact of many different health care reform 
proposals. 
In Section II we outline a conceptual framework for our analysis.  Section III examines 
econometric challenges to estimating the hypothesized effects that we predict and provides a 
justification for our use of malpractice payments as an instrumental variable for health 
premiums.  In Section IV we describe the data that use.  In an appendix we discuss in more detail 
several features of the National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB), the dataset that we use to 
construct measures of the malpractice liability environment in each state and year.  In Section V 
we present empirical results, including specification checks that provide validation for our use of 
3   malpractice payments as a plausible instrument for health insurance premiums. Finally, in 
Section VI we conclude with a discussion of the policy implications of our findings.  
 
II.  CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
  Summers (1989) examines the effects of mandated benefits (versus taxes) on wages and 
employment, highlighting the importance of the employees’ valuation of the benefit.  The 
provision of a benefit that is fully-valued by workers should not change employment – but 
should decrease wages by the cost of the benefit.  Gruber and Krueger (1991) discuss this model 
more formally. In their framework, let Ld = f(W + αC) and Ls = (W + C) be the labor demand 
and supply curves respectively. W represents wages and αC represents employees’ monetary 
valuation of health insurance. It is straightforward to demonstrate that: 






d  and  η
s are the price elasticities of labor demand and supply. If α=1, then wages fall by 
the full cost of the mandated benefit, and if α=0, then the results are identical to those obtained 
for the incidence of a payroll tax. Additionally, the proportional change in employment will be 
given by: 
(2)  dL/L = η
d (W0 – W1  – ∆C ) / W0 
where W0  and W1  represent  the initial  and final levels of wages. Equation (2) demonstrates that 
the effect of rising health insurance costs on employment is inversely proportional to the wage 
offset caused by the employer provision of health insurance, and proportional to the elasticity of 
labor demand. 
There are several reasons that wages may not respond to an increase in the price of a 
health benefit. First, depending on the magnitude of the α parameter, it is not clear how 
4   employees value an increase in health insurance costs if they are not accompanied by increases 
in the quality or quantity of benefits. If there has been an increase in benefit provision which 
substantially raises the costs of being uninsured (or, for that matter, a relative decrease in the 
utility of being covered in the non-group market), it is even possible that labor supply could 
increase to the point of raising total employment (formally, this would happen if α>1). 
Additionally, workers may be myopic in their perceptions of the value of benefits – Gustman and 
Steinmeier (2001) note that survey respondents are often not even aware of the value of their 
pension and social-security benefits, and similar ignorance may characterize workers’ valuation 
of health benefits. Second, workers may not be perfectly sorted between firms based on their 
preferences for benefits, and non-discrimination stipulations in the tax code limit the 
differentiation of benefit packages to full-time workers within the same firm. These non-
discrimination constraints create incentives to move workers between “covered” (with benefits) 
full time jobs and “uncovered” part time jobs.  Third, the ability of firms to reduce wages for 
lower-skilled workers is restricted by the minimum wage.  For this group (and broader groups 
subject to wage rigidities), increases in employers’ costs of providing health insurance will result 
in employment reductions or in employers discontinuing health insurance benefits. For these 
three reasons, increases in the cost of health insurance could affect both total compensation and 
employment. 
This model also does not capture an important dimension of potential employer responses 
to increased benefit costs:  firms may offer benefits only to their full time employees, and an 
increase in the cost of a full time employee relative to a part time employee may induce firms to 
substitute towards part time workers. Note that such a substitution could result from benefits not 
being fully valued or from institutional constraints to differentially providing benefits or 
5   changing wages.  This substitution towards part-time workers could result in a decrease in 
employer health insurance coverage and in hours worked, but an increase in employment, as 
measured by the number of employees. In contrast, if health insurance is viewed as a fixed cost 
per employee, increases in health insurance costs could cause firms to increase the hours of work 
per employee but reduce the number of employees.
5  This effect ought to be concentrated in 
employees who work few hours, because it is precisely this group who would become more 
costly as a result of an increase in health insurance premiums. Employers may also find it 
attractive to move such workers to part-time positions without health insurance.  
In light of these ambiguous analytical predictions on hours, employment, and the fraction 
of full time and part time jobs, assessing the labor market effects of increases in health insurance 
premiums is fundamentally an empirical question.
6
 
III.  EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
Evaluating the effect of rising health premiums on employment, wages, hours worked 
and the composition of employment (the share of jobs that are full time or part time) empirically 
is an exercise with numerous challenges.  Datasets such as the Census and the CPS do not 
                                                 
5 Cutler and Madrian (1998) develop such a model and find that when health insurance costs go up, the 
firm will find it advantageous to increase the hours of work per employee and reduce the number of 
employees. They find that increased health-insurance costs in the 1980s led to a 3% increase in hours 
worked for those with EHI (and a decline in hours worked for those without EHI). However, in the 
Cutler-Madrian model it will cost the firm more in wages/benefits to encourage workers to supply more 
labor at the intensive margin.  Thus, even with their highly stylized model, the net effect of an increase in 
the cost of benefits on both hours and employment is ambiguous:  The firm will want to increase the 
hours worked by its employees if the marginal increase in compensation is less than the average hourly 
cost of providing benefits, but it will want to decrease hours worked and hire more workers in if the 
opposite is true.  Because workers control the composition of the compensation package, the effect of 
increases in health insurance premiums on health insurance coverage will depend on whether workers 
fully value the health benefits.  
6 In an earlier version of this paper we included a formal model of the effect of health insurance premium 
increases on the labor market. As the above discussion notes, such a model is unable to generate 
unambiguous comparative statics and we have omitted it here.  
6   contain information on the employer costs of health insurance or the generosity of plans. 
Additionally, even if this information were available, such datasets do not allow the researcher to 
control adequately for worker characteristics that might also influence the outcome under study.
7  
In principle, a large-scale social experiment that does not suffer from attrition or agents 
attempting to compensate for their treatment regime may solve selection problems of this nature, 
and an instrumental variable estimation strategy can reproduce the experimental estimate if the 
underlying assumptions behind IV estimation are satisfied.  
To motivate our analysis, consider the following structural equation for a worker i in state 
j and in year t: 
(3)    Outcomeijt = β0+ β1  HIi + XiΠ +Sj +Tt +εijt         
Here, Outcomei  is the labor market outcome of interest (hours worked, wages, wage income, 
unemployment, part-time/full-time status, or receipt of health insurance). Xi  measures person-
level covariates including controls for family structure, marital status and industry. Sj and Tt are 
state and year fixed effects respectively, and εijt is a person-specific idiosyncratic term.
8   HIi 
measures the employer costs of providing individual i with EHI. Technically, HIi should measure 
the difference between employer premiums and premiums for policies purchased in the non-
group market. We note that non-group health insurance (for individuals and families) appears to 
be priced nationally, so that controlling for individual characteristics accounts for variation in 
non-group prices.
9 The above equation can be modified to include interaction effects and 
                                                 
7 These limitations are identical to those that have plagued the literature on identifying the wage-fringe 
tradeoff. Currie and Madrian (2000) provide a comprehensive overview of this literature. 
8  Cutler and Madrian do not include state fixed effects. Yelowitz (1994) examines data from California; 
his analysis is therefore comparable to one where state fixed effects are included. 
9  Using data from www.eHealthInsurance.com, an online website that provides insurance quotes from 
many carriers, we note that there was less than a 5 percent difference in premiums across states like 
Arizona, California, Nebraska and Ohio. We priced premiums for a non-smoking family, comprising two 
parents (ages 35 and 37) and two children (ages 9 and 11). Each plan included an annual deductible of no 
7   indicator variables for certain demographic groups that may be of particular interest (for 
example, hourly workers, married women, workers near the minimum wage, or workers with 
EHI).   
The first problem inherent in OLS estimation of (3) is that cov (Cost of HIi εi) ≠ 0.  For 
example, workers with high ability may work at firms that offer generous health benefits, and, 
therefore, high premiums.  Second, datasets such as the SIPP or CPS do not report the value or 
generosity of the health-insurance plan received by a worker.  Empirical researchers have 
responded to this limitation by imputing health insurance premiums to each respondent based on 
industry (Cutler and Madrian, 1998) and based on industry, firm-size and family/single status 
(Yelowitz, 2004).  These imputations solve the missing data problem and can in principle reduce 
the potential endogeneity problem.  We first discuss the identification strategy implicit in this 
approach, and then contrast it with our alternative strategy. 
  Imputed premium data may be thought of as representing premiums that have been 
obtained using the match characteristics (such as industry and family structure) as instruments. 
That is, assuming that data on HIi was available, we could, in principle, estimate:  
(4)      H I dfs = γ0 +  Industryd +Firm Sizef + Family Structures + vdfs   
The dfs subscripts make explicit the notion that (4) is estimated at the level of Industry d, Firm 
Size f, and Family Structure s and not at the level of a person i. Equation (4) could also be 
                                                                                                                                                             
more than $2,000 in addition to 20% coinsurance. Additionally, each plan had a maximum per-family 
out-of-pocket cost of between $4,000 and $10,000 per year.There are differences across states in what the 
policy covers (e.g. maternity benefits) and these differences do translate into higher premiums. However, 
the inclusion of state fixed-effects captures any residual variation in non-group premiums at the state 
level. We are grateful to Derek Neal for suggesting this clarification.  
11 In theory we could also use malpractice premiums as an instrument for health insurance premiums. 
However, there is no systematic source of malpractice insurance data. There is an annual survey 
conducted by the publication Medical Liability Monitor, but the survey does not rely on administrative 
data, does not cover all states or medical specialties, and varies year-to-year in the number of insurers 
who are surveyed. 
8   estimated at the state level. One could use the fitted values from (4)  dfs HI  as the key regressor in 
the estimation of (3). Implicity, these fitted values may be thought of as characterizing the 
relationship: 
(5)          H I i  ≡  dfs HI + mi     
Here, mi represents the portion of health-insurance premiums that are idiosyncratic to person i. 
Therefore, it is probably the case that cov(εijt , mi ) ≠ 0 (that is, mi is determined by factors other 
than industry, firm-size and family structure).  If the instruments are valid, then cov(εijt ,  dfs HI ) 
=0, and we may estimate: 
(6)     O u t c o m e ijt= β0+ β1 dfs HI  + XiΠ + Sj +Tt +εijt         
The central problem with estimating (6) in lieu of (3) is the possibility that cov( dfs HI , εi ) ≠ 0. 
This would be true if the “instruments” (industry, firm-size, family structure) are correlated with 
εi, the unobservable characteristics of the worker. If workers in a certain sector of the economy, 
or those who are married, are systematically more likely to have different levels of unobservable 
characteristics that affect health insurance premiums, then such a correlation is possible. This 
problem is identical to the standard endogeneity problem in program evaluation, where receipt of 
the treatment is correlated with unobservable characteristics of the person receiving treatment. 
A solution to this problem is to instrument for imputed premiums using variables that are 
uncorrelated with εi   and mi but are correlated with imputed health insurance premiums. In our 
analysis we use state level per-capita medical malpractice payments as an instrument for imputed 
premiums.  For malpractice payments to provide a valid instrumental variable for imputed 
premiums, it must be the case that the instruments affect health premiums. Second, it should also 
9   be the case that malpractice payments are not correlated with unobservable characteristics of 
workers. In the next subsection, we explore the prima facia validity of these assumptions.  
 
The Medical Malpractice Crisis 
The “medical malpractice crisis” that began at the turn of the 21
st century refers to the 
dramatic increase in physician premiums for malpractice insurance. Baicker, Chandra and Fisher 
(2004), Chandra, Nundy and Seabury (2005), and Mello, Studdert, and Brennan (2003) provide 
an overview of this crisis and its underlying causes and consequences. Both the American 
Medical Association (AMA) and the Physician Insurers Association of America (PIAA) attribute 
the dramatic increase in physician malpractice insurance premiums to the growth in malpractice 
payments (see AMA (2004a, 2004b) and Smarr (2003)). Whereas other factors such as declines 
in insurers investment income – including the presence of an underwriting cycle, a less 
competitive insurance market, and climbing reinsurance rates – are acknowledged to have 
contributed to this medical malpractice crisis, insurer losses from increases in malpractice 
payments are believed to be the primary contributor to the growth of malpractice premiums. 
Indeed, a General Accounting Office (GAO) study of seven states concluded that the growth of 
insurer’s losses from payments is the primary driver of the growth of premiums (see GAO,  
2003a and 2003b).  
If the demand for health services is inelastic, then the effect of increasing malpractice 
payments on malpractice premiums will have little effect on net physician compensation.   
Indeed, Baicker and Chandra (2005) argue that because of the nature of  health insurance (which 
insulates the patient from the marginal costs of seeking care and which is subsidized by the tax 
code), the demand for medical services is relatively inelastic.  The demand for health services by 
Medicare beneficiaries is likely to be even less elastic, as they are further insulated from even a 
10   wage-fringe benefit tradeoff.  Consumers of health care are therefore likely to bear the brunt of 
the cost through increases in the price of health care (and, consequently, health insurance 
premiums).
11    With this preliminary validation, we use increases in malpractice payments as an 
instrument for health insurance premiums to estimate the following first-stage equation: 
(7)  ijt HI = γ0+ γ1 Malpractice Paymentsjt + XiΠ + Sj +Tt +vi     
where, as discussed below, malpractice payments are broken down by the size and number of 
payments for different specialties. Instrumenting for imputed premiums removes the bias from 
any residual correlation between  εi   and  ijt HI  .  This is because the instrument only picks up that 
part of the (within-state) variation in imputed premiums that is attributable to (within-state) 
changes in malpractice climate. It may be tempting to reason that the correlation of premiums 
with the instrument, malpractice payments, is potentially spurious because states with high 
malpractice payments may have workers who are systematically more or less abled.  This is not 
the case, however, as all of our specifications include state fixed effects.  
It is particularly important in the context of this source of variation to understand the way 
that workers will value benefits.  Our use of this instrument does not rely on the fact that workers 
get more or better health care as their premiums rise.  Rather, as malpractice costs rise, the price 
of purchasing health care through any source – employer insurance, non-group insurance, or out 
of pocket – will increase.  Workers may be willing to accept lower wages in exchange for 
costlier health insurance because they would have to pay more on the open market for it, whether 
or not the increase in premiums is associated with higher value health care. 
 
11   IV.  DATA 
A.  Health Insurance Premiums 
  We use annual state-level data on health insurance premiums by type of policy (family or 
single) and employer size from the Kaiser Family Foundation/HRET survey for 1996 to 2002 
(see Kaiser Family Foundation, 2003).
12   We assign premiums to workers based on their state of 
residence and year.  In most specifications we also match based on family structure (with single 
respondents given the single premium) and on firm size (with employees of small firms given the 
small firm premium, and unemployed respondents given the average premium) – although we 
also test the sensitivity of our results to potential changes in the composition of family size and 
employment.  
  In Figure 1 we illustrate the steady growth in premiums for family premiums and single 
premiums over the time-period of our study. All dollar figures are expressed in year 2001 
dollars. Family premiums grew from an average of $5,000 in 1996 to well over $8,000 in 2002. 
Premiums for single policies also grew substantially—from an economy-wide average of $2,000 
in 1996 to over $3,000 in 2002. In Figure 2 we illustrate the details of family and single policies 
for the 10 states with the largest population in 2000— Panel A reports the level of premiums in 
1996 and Panel B in 2002.  We see that family premiums grew between 40 and 60 percent over 
this time period in these states. The growth in single person premiums was relatively smaller but 
still considerable: in states such as Florida, Georgia, Michigan and Ohio, premiums for single 
people grew by over 40 percent. Both panels also show the share of total premiums that were 
                                                 
12 The Kaiser Family Foundation/Health Research and Educational Trust 2004 Annual Employer Health 
Benefits Survey (Kaiser/HRET) reports findings from a telephone survey of 1,925 randomly selected 
public and private employers. Firms range in size from small enterprises with a minimum of three 
workers to corporations with more than 300,000 employees. The Kaiser/HRET Employer Health Benefits 
Survey is based on previous surveys sponsored by the Health Insurance Association of America from 
1986–1991 and Bearing Point (KPMG at the time of the surveys) from 1991–1998. 
 
12   paid for by employee and employer contributions—even though premiums increased 
substantially, the share paid by employees remained relatively stable. 
 
B.  Labor Market Data 
  The Current Population Survey (CPS) is a monthly survey of about 50,000 households 
conducted by the Bureau of the Census for the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The survey has been 
conducted for more than 50 years and is the primary source of information on the labor force 
characteristics of the U.S. civilian non-institutional population. The March (Annual 
Demographic Survey) files of the CPS contain information on hours worked, wage and salary 
income, unemployment, and health insurance coverage in the past year.  In several years the 
February Dislocated Worker Supplement asked questions on health insurance eligibility and 
employer offering, in addition to actual coverage (for both dislocated and non-dislocated 
workers).  
  We use data from the 1996-2002 March CPS, supplemented with information from the  
1997, 1999, and 2001 February survey.  Because individuals are included in the CPS in two 4-
month cycles, our February samples include only three-quarters of the respondents from that 
year's March sample.  We use information on demographics (such as age, gender, race, marital 
status, family size, and education), labor market variables (such as wage and salary, employment 
status, firm size, and hours worked), and health insurance coverage (such as source of coverage, 
and, from the February supplement, whether coverage was offered by the respondent's employer 
and whether the respondent was eligible). Because we expect premiums from last year to affect 
current labor market outcomes, we measure hours worked, full-time/part-time status and 
unemployment during the reference week of the survey (typically the second week of March). 
13   We include all respondents between the ages of 22 and 64, although we further limit the sample 
in some of our analyses.  Our data are summarized in Table 1. 
 
 
C.  Medical Malpractice Payments 
All malpractice payments made in the United States by or on behalf of a licensed health 
care provider must be reported to the National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB) within 30 days 
under the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986.  Noncompliance is subject to civil 
penalties codified in 42 U.S.C. 11131-11152.  We examine payments that resulted from either a 
court judgment against the provider or a settlement made outside of the courts.  We use NPDB 
information on such payments for 1996-2002.
13  We calculate the size and number of payments 
resulting from medical treatments (including diagnosis, medication, and other medical 
treatment), surgical treatments (including surgery and anesthesia), obstetrical treatment, and 
other treatments (including monitoring, equipment, intravenous and blood, and all others).  Table 
1 shows the growth of per-capita malpractice payments at the state level between 1996-99 and 
2000-02. The variability of payments (over time within states) is the source of our identification. 
For example, over the 2001-03 period, per-capita payments were highest in the states of New 
York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Connecticut, West Virginia and Delaware.  In these states the 
burden of malpractice liability was almost twice the US average of $13.5 per person. See 
Chandra et al. (2005) for more details on the growth of malpractice payments as measured by the 
NPDB. We discuss potential limitations of the NPDB in the Appendix.  
                                                 
13 We exclude payments that were linked to dentists, pharmacists, social workers or nurses.  In a small 
fraction of payments, there are multiple physician defendants (and thus multiple reports) but only the total 
payment by all defendants is reported.  In these cases we average the payment by the number of 
physicians involved.  In the NPDB, 5 percent of payments are made by state funds in addition to other 
payments made by the primary insurer for the same incident. We match such payments based on an 
algorithm that uses unique physician identifiers, state of work, state of licensure, area of malpractice, type 
of payment (judgment or settlement) and year of occurrence.   
14     In some specifications we calculate malpractice payments per physician by obtaining data 
on state level physician counts using data from the 2003 Area Resource File (ARF) published by 
the National Center for Health Workforce Analysis.  Data on the physician workforce by 
specialty and age are only available for 1989, 1995, 2000, and 2001.  Intervening years are 
linearly interpolated. 
 
V.  RESULTS 
  We begin with an examination of the effect of increases in health insurance premiums on 
employment, wages, and hours worked.  The odd columns of Table 2 show the results of OLS 
estimation of equation  (6).  All regressions include state and year fixed effects and the 
individual-level controls outlined above, and are weighted using the March CPS final weights.  
Standard errors are clustered at the state level (clustering at the state-year level yields marginally 
smaller standard errors).   Premiums, income, and hours are all measured in logs.  The OLS 
effect of increases in health insurance premiums on wage and salary income, employment, and 
hours is small:  a 10 percent increase in premiums leads to a 0.3 percent decrease in wage and 
salary income and a 0.04 percent increase in hours worked.  
As discussed above, however, the OLS results are likely to be biased by omitted 
individual characteristics (such as ability) and economic conditions.  We use medical malpractice 
payments (including real per capita dollars and the number of payments per capita, by specialty, 
current and lagged) to instrument for health insurance premiums.  Similar results are obtained 
when payments are measured per doctor, rather than per capita.  Table 3 reports first stage 
regressions for these instruments as in equation (5).  For the two-stage least squares estimates 
that follow, we use the most flexible form of the instruments (which provides the greatest power 
15   in the first stage, with a joint F-statistic of 8.75), but here we show more constrained forms to aid 
in interpretation (since payments by different specialties are highly correlated).  The results 
suggest that when per capita malpractice payments double, health insurance premiums increase 
by 1 to 2 percent.  This is consistent with previous estimates that malpractice payments comprise 
around 1 percent of total health expenditures (Kessler and McClellan, 1996).  We show the 
results of a similar regression at the state-year (rather than individual) level graphically in Figure 
3. 
  Results from two-stage least squares estimation of equation (6) are shown in the even 
columns of Table 2.  Here we see a much bigger (although statistically insignificant) decrease in 
annual wage and salary income—a 10 percent increase in premiums reduces wages and salary by 
1.3 percent. There is a large effect of premiums on usual hours worked – coming partly from 
increases in the probability of unemployment but also through increases in the probability of part 
time work.  This is consistent with our expectation that as the cost of providing health insurance 
benefits increases, firms will substitute part time workers with limited benefits for full time 
workers with benefits.  In fact, in our data only 22 percent of part time workers have employer 
health insurance, while 64 percent of full time workers do. Consistent with the reduction in full-
time jobs, there is also an overall decline in employment rates and a (statistically insignificant) 
decline in being covered by employer provided health insurance. In contrast to the OLS results, 
all the IV results are consistent with the predictions of a model where workers partially value 
health benefits or where firms are constrained in their ability to adjust wages.  
  As health insurance costs have risen, popular concern has grown over increases in   
required employee contributions to health insurance premiums.  In fact, between 1996 and 2002, 
employee contributions to health insurance premiums remained relatively stable at just under 20 
16   percent.  This fraction does not seem to respond to increases in health insurance premiums – 
using our IV specification in column 12, the fraction of premiums paid by employees (and 
consequently employers) does not respond to increases in premiums. As shown in column 14, the 
dollar amount paid by employees and employers increases in the same proportion: We estimate 
that a 10 percent increase in premiums results in a 10 percent increase in both employer and 
employee contributions.   
  As previous models and empirical research have suggested, we might expect certain 
groups to be more sensitive in changes in the cost of health insurance.  First, workers with health 
insurance should see a much bigger offset in their wages than workers without, who should see 
none.  The first column of Table 4 tests this hypothesis by including the interaction of health 
insurance premiums and an indicator for coverage by employer health insurance.  We see that, in 
fact, all of the reductions in income are borne by employees with health insurance.  The 
magnitude of the elasticity of -0.23 is consistent with dollar-for-dollar offset (since premiums 
(paid with pre-tax dollars) are about 20 percent of wage and salary income at the mean) – 
implying that covered workers bear the full incidence of increases in health insurance premiums.  
Similarly, as column (2) shows, part time workers see an increase in wages when health 
insurance premiums increase – consistent with workers moving from full time jobs with benefits 
to part time jobs with higher wages instead of benefits. These results also suggest that we should 
see differential effects of increases in premiums on employer health insurance coverage.  The 
second panel of Table 4 explores this.  Column (4) shows that part time workers are less likely to 
have employer health insurance as premiums increase, consistent with the results in column (2). 
If our theory’s predictions are correct, we should also see declines in wages and salary income 
(and health insurance coverage from an employer) for workers in sectors where the demand for 
17   labor is particularly elastic. Because manufacturing goods are nationally traded and the labor 
demand for manufacturing workers is a derived demand, we would expect the local demand for 
such workers to be particularly sensitive to the price of health insurance. Columns (3) and (8) 
verify that this is indeed true.
14
  Which workers would be most likely to give up employer health insurance (in exchange 
for higher wages) as premiums increase?  Married, healthy women are likely to have a lower 
value of employer health insurance, as they may have access to insurance though their husbands 
and lower utilization of health services.  We construct an indicator variable for married women 
with self-reported health status of “excellent” or “very good.” As column (5) shows, these 
women are indeed more likely to lose employer health insurance when premiums go up.   
Another group we might expect to be more likely to lose employer health insurance are workers 
facing institutional constraints - such as minimum wage workers whose wages cannot be lowered 
to accommodate increased benefits costs.  As column (5) shows, workers who are paid hourly 
with a wage of less than $8/hour are significantly more likely to lose health insurance as 
premiums increase.   
  Why do these groups “lose” health insurance?  Do their employers stop offering health 
insurance (or do they move to jobs that don't offer insurance), or, alternatively, do they stop 
taking up health insurance that is offered to them, perhaps because of higher copays or employee 
premiums?  While we have limited information on this front, we use the February CPS 
supplement to explore the change in employer health insurance offering when premiums 
increase.  These results are reported in Table 5.  Overall (column 1), there is little decrease in 
                                                 
14 Employment in the manufacturing sector is measured as major industry of employment last year, while 
the dependent variable is measured as employment last week.  (For this reason, we cannot include 
interactions with hours or employer health insurance, also measured currently as opposed to last year, 
using this dependent variable.) 
18   employer offering, but for hourly workers, a subgroup that we have identified as more likely to 
be affected by premium increases (column 2), we see more significant decline in employer 
offering as premiums increase. Here a 10 percent increase in premiums results in a 3.8 
percentage point reduction in the probability of being offered health insurance coverage. 
  In Table 6 we explore the robustness of our identification strategy. We study the 
relationship between predicted heath-insurance premiums and variables that should not be 
predicted by our instruments. (The predicted premium captures the variation in our instruments 
that is used in the IV estimation.) Columns (1) to (5) of Table 6 demonstrate that the instruments 
are unable to predict variation in percent black, educational attainment, gender, marital status and 
health. Compositional changes in the levels of these variables could potentially affect the labor 
market outcomes that we study, but should not be affected by the increase in malpractice 
payments – and they are not. To further test our identification strategy, we also include as a 
dependent variable the probability that an employee is included in an employer pension plan, 
shown in column (6) of Table 6.  This could be viewed as a falsification test – health insurance 
premiums might not be expected to affect pension benefits – but it is possible that when health 
plan costs go up, all other forms of compensation (wages and other benefits) are reduced to 
absorb the cost.  This does not seem to be the case:  the probability of an employee having a 
pension benefit does not respond to increases in health insurance premiums in the IV 
specification, with an insignificant coefficient estimate of 0.12 (robust s.e. 0.12).  Finally, in the 
last three columns, we note the lack of relationship between predicted premiums and health 
outcomes (measured at the state-year level).
15 This finding rules out a class of explanations 
wherein the population of states with relatively higher malpractice payments is relatively 
                                                 
15 Data on aggregate mortality come from the Area Resource File (reported at the county-year level, 
aggregated to the state-year level by the authors) 
19   sicker—and as sickness levels increase, health premiums rise.  Population illness levels are not 
the driving factor here. Table 6 also notes that predicted premiums are not associated with higher 
cesarean-section rates (a procedure that is widely believed to be affected by the use of “defensive 
medicine”).
16
  We can use our estimates to study the economy-wide impact of the growth of health-
insurance premiums.  Using the estimates in Tables 2 and 4, we can calculate the effect of rising 
health insurance premiums on the probability of being employed, employed as a full-time 
worker, average hours worked and annual income. These estimates are summarized in Table 7.  
A 20 percent increase in health insurance premiums (smaller than the increase seen in many 
areas in the last 3 years) would reduce the probability of being employed by 3 percentage 
points—the equivalent of approximately 4 million workers. A similar number of workers would 
move from full time jobs to part time, reducing the average number of hours worked per week by 
a little less than 1 hour. Annual (wage) income would be reduced by $2,000 for those who are 
employed and have EHI.  Together, these estimates demonstrate that the labor market effects of 
rising health insurance are far from neutral.  
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
  Rising health insurance premiums, unemployment, and uninsurance have led to increased 
scrutiny of the labor market consequences of rising benefits costs.  These relationships are, 
however, difficult to disentangle without a source of exogenous variation.  We use variation in 
                                                 
16 Baicker and Chandra (2005) and Baicker, Fisher and Chandra (2004) demonstrate that increases in 
medical malpractice liability are not associated with changes in physician flows or the greater use of 
surgical procedures. This finding rules out a situation where increases in malpractice payments affect both 
the price and quantity of healthcare received by workers; changes in the malpractice climate appear to 
only affect the price of healthcare as measured by health insurance premiums. 
20   medical malpractice payments to derive the causal effect of rising health insurance premiums on 
wages, employment, and health insurance coverage.   
  We find that the cost of increasing health insurance premiums is borne primarily by 
workers in the form of decreased wages for workers with employer health insurance  – so that 
they bear the full cost of the premium increase, but do not face labor market distortions.  Our 
analysis implies that workers do at least partially value health insurance benefits, but that there 
are impediments to full adjustment through wages, particularly for certain groups.  Non-
discrimination clauses that prevent firms from discontinuing coverage only for those workers 
who value it least mean that firms and workers have an incentive to move from full time jobs 
with benefits to part time jobs without as the costs of benefits rise.  We see exactly this 
adjustment, with an increase in part time work (and increased wages and lower health insurance 
coverage rates for those workers).  Workers who value coverage the least will have the greatest 
incentive to move into jobs that do not offer coverage as premiums rise.  We find that groups that 
are likely to have low value of health insurance coverage through their employer, such as healthy 
married women, are more likely to lose coverage as premiums rise.  Some workers, particularly 
low wage hourly workers whose wages cannot be reduced, may face even greater risk of 
becoming uninsured as the cost of health insurance increases.   
  Our results on wage-shifting are consistent with those in Gruber (1994):  for workers with 
EHI, we observe full shifting of the increased price of health insurance onto wages. In addition, 
our results provide further evidence that the effects of increasing costs are borne 
disproportionately by particular groups.
17  In contrast to Gruber’s study and to the results in 
Gruber and Krueger (1991), we find effects on both hours and employment. These results may 
                                                 
17 Gruber (1994) finds that the cost of the maternity benefits are fully borne by married women. Sheiner 
(1995) finds that demographic groups with higher ex ante insurance costs (such as older workers) 
experience full wage shifting when the price of health insurance increases.  
21   appear to be contradictory but they are not: in Gruber’s study workers receive new maternity 
benefits and in Gruber and Krueger they receive more generous workers compensation. The fact 
that these studies find full shifting of increased costs to wages with no effect of the utilization of 
labor is thus consistent with the insights of Summers (1989) for the case of benefits that are 
valued by workers. In our paper, however, the increase in the price of health insurance premiums 
driven by the medical malpractice crisis did not change the generosity of health benefits. It is 
therefore unsurprising that workers do not value this increase in costs as highly, and that the 
labor market responds with decreased wages and labor utilization.  
  These results have strong implications for policies designed to cover the uninsured.   For 
example, if employer health insurance mandates raise the cost of employing workers, we should 
expect most workers to bear the cost through reduced wages.  If some classes of workers are 
exempt from the mandate (such as part time workers or those at particularly small firms), 
employers are likely to substitute uncovered jobs for covered ones, undermining the net effect of 
the mandate on insurance rates.  More generally, rising health insurance premiums will place an 
increasing burden on workers and increase the ranks of both the uninsured and the unemployed.    
 
 
22   APPENDIX 1: DISCUSSION OF THE  NPDB 
The NPDB has been the subject of much criticism, from the PIAA in particular,  and also from 
the GAO [GAO (2000) and Smarr (2003)]. One of the major points of criticism is the “corporate shield.” 
This is a loophole that makes payments made on behalf of a hospital or other corporation exempt from 
inclusion in the NPDB, as long as any individual practitioner is dropped as part of a settlement agreement 
(see Hallinan (2004) for a recent commentary on this problem). We assess the potential importance of this 
source of bias by comparing jury verdicts reported in the NPDB to those from a proprietary data set 
compiled by the RAND Institute for Civil Justice based on the JVR (called the Jury Verdict Database, or 
JVDB) for New York and California.
18 Between 1991 and 1999 the JVDB data showed an average annual 
growth of awards against physicians of 3.9% in New York (and an average of 42 awards) and 4.3% in 
California (and an average of 35 awards), while the NPDB reported average annual growth of 13% in 
New York (with an average of 53 awards) and 1.6% in California (with an average of 43 awards). These 
results seem remarkably consistent, given the very different sampling frames. Nevertheless, we 
acknowledge that the corporate shield would result in some large payments not being reported to the 
databank. Even if this is true, it is not a source of bias—these omissions would only serve to weaken the 
estimated first-stage. A more problematic source of bias would occur if there is state-level variation in the 
magnitude of the corporate shield (a hypothesis on which there is no formal or anecdotal evidence). We 
include state-fixed effects in our analysis to help ameliorate this potential problem.   
Despite its limitations, the NPDB is the most representative national and publicly available 
database on physician malpractice payments. Indeed, according to Hallinan (2004) hospitals rely on its 
existence to query the malpractice histories of potential hires; in 2002 the databank was queried 1.12 
million times, or over 3,000 times a day.  
                                                 
18 We are grateful to Aaron Yelowitz for recommending that that we explore the potential limitation of the 
NPDB in the context of the corporate shield. We are indebted to Seth Seabury at the RAND Institute for 
Civil Justice for facilitating this analysis.  
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Data from Kaiser Family Foundation/HRET survey.  Premiums expressed in real year 2001 
dollars.





















































Employer and Employee Shares for Family and Single Policies in Large States
Health Insurance Premiums in 1996

























































Employer and Employee Shares for Family and Single Policies in Large States
Health Insurance Premiums in 2002





Data from Kaiser Family Foundation/HRET survey.  Premiums expressed in real year 2001 
dollars.  Ten largest states (by population) shown. 
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Line represents regression-adjusted coefficient of 0.03 (clustered s.e. 0.01).
Controls include population demographics and state and year fixed effects.
State-Year Data, Regression Adjusted






Sample includes annual observations of 48 continental US states from 1996 to 2002.  
Controls include categorical measures of educational attainment, race, age, marital status, health status, 
and gender mix (at the state-year level), as well as state and year fixed effects.  Standard errors are 
clustered at the state level. 
Malpractice payment data from National Practitioner Data Bank.  Health insurance premium data from 
Kaiser Family Foundation/HRET survey.  All dollars expressed in real year 2001 units.  Covariates 
aggregated to state-year level from annual March CPS. 
 
28   Mean Std Dev Obs Mean Std Dev Obs Mean Std Dev Obs
Health Insurance Variables
Premiums 5,266 1,955 513,068 4,782 1,658 288,900 5,959 2,131 224,168
HI from Employer 0.51 0.50 513,068 0.50 0.50 288,900 0.51 0.50 303,628
Any HI 0.82 0.39 513,068 0.81 0.39 288,900 0.82 0.39 303,628
Employer Offers HI 0.93 0.26 73,779 0.92 0.27 52,014 0.93 0.26 21,765
Labor Market Outcomes
Hours 32.5 20.1 476,580 30.0 21.2 288,900 36.8 17.1 187,680
Wage and Salary Income (real) 26,209         35,501         513,068 25,457      35,102      288,900 27,285      36,037      224,168
Part time (<30 hours per week) 0.16 0.36 377,921 0.16 0.37 212,346 0.15 0.36 165,575
Employed 0.80 0.40 476,580 0.74 0.44 288,900 0.90 0.29 187,680
Malpractice Payments (real per cap $)
Total 12.70 7.46 509,985 12.36 7.07 286,874 12.97 7.74 302,386
Internal Medicine 7.38 4.49 509,985 7.15 4.25 286,874 7.57 4.71 302,386
Ob-Gyn 1.75 1.33 493,610 1.66 1.27 278,897 1.82 1.35 292,813
Surgery 3.33 1.97 509,985 3.30 1.90 286,874 3.35 1.97 302,386
Malpractice Payments (number per capita)
Total 0.021 0.008 509,985 0.021 0.008 286,874 0.021 0.008 302,386
Internal Medicine 0.094 0.043 509,985 0.095 0.042 286,874 0.091 0.043 302,386
Ob-Gyn 0.033 0.016 493,610 0.033 0.015 278,897 0.033 0.015 292,813
Surgery 0.029 0.011 509,985 0.029 0.011 286,874 0.030 0.011 302,386
Notes: Individual-level observations from 1996-2002 Current Population Survey.  Sample limited to those age 22-64.
Health insurance premiums from Kaiser/HRET survey (state-year data on premiums by policy type and employer size).
Malpractice payments from National Practitioner Data Bank.
Labor market outcomes and employer health insurance information from Current Population Survey (March and February).
All 1996-1999 2000-2002
Table 1:  Summary StatisticsOLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Sample:  All
-0.033 -0.128 -0.004 -0.155 0.004 -0.102 0.005 0.186 -0.027 -0.063 -0.145 -0.020 0.397 1.130
Ln (HI Premium) (.020) (.136) (.007) (.071) (.005) (.054) (.007) (.061) (.013) (.092) (.031) (.103) (.122) (.419)
 
           R-squared  0.237 0.237 0.161 0.154 0.080 0.075 0.047 0.033 0.111 0.111 0.626 0.616 0.921 0.918
           N  346,524    346,524    447,883    447,883    368,230    368,230    328,952    328,952    447,883    447,883    368,230    368,230    368,230     368,230   
Covariates and FEs yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Notes:
Individual-level observations from 1996-2002 Current Population Survey.  Sample limited to those age 22-64.
Health insurance premiums from Kaiser/HRET survey (state-year data on premiums by policy type and employer size).
Malpractice payments from National Practitioner Data Bank.
Labor market outcomes and employer health insurance information from Current Population Survey (March).
Part-time workers work less than 30 hours per week.
Regressions weighted by March CPS weights, and standard errors clustered at state level.
Premiums assigned based on state, year, family structure (and employer size for employed).
Ln (Employee 
Contribution to HI)
Have HI Through 
Employer




Employed Employee Share of 
HI Premium
Table 2:  Effect of Premiums on Labor Market Outcomes
Instruments include real dollar amount and number of medical malpractice payments per capita for different specialties (surgery, ob-gyn, internal medicine, and other) for current year 
and previous year.
Covariates include race, age, age^2, age^3, marital status, education, gender, and health status.(1) (2) (4)










Number of Surg Pymts -0.015
(.012)
Number of Ob-Gyn Pymts 0.007
(.007)
Number of Int Med Pymts 0.010
(.019)
Number of Other Pymts -0.003
(.003)
F-test significance 0.125 0.048 0.004
Covariates no yes yes
State and year effects yes yes yes
Notes:
Malpractice payments from National Practitioner Data Bank.
Growth of payments measured as change in real payments per 
capita or number of payments per capita.
Table 3:  First Stage Regressions
Standard errors clustered at state level.
Covariates include race, age, age^2, age^3, marital status, 
education, gender, and health status.
Individual-level observations from 1996-2002 Current Population 
Survey.  Sample limited to those age 22-64.
Health insurance premiums from Kaiser/HRET survey (state-year 
data on premiums by policy type and employer size).
(log-log specification)
Effect of Growth in 
Malpractice Payments on 
Health InsurancePremiumsEmployed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Ln (HI Premium) -0.114 -0.313 -0.195 -0.040 0.002 -0.102 -0.065 -0.079
               (0.196) (0.166) (0.134) (0.103) (0.109) (0.100) (0.102) (0.068)
Ln (HI Prem) *Employer HI -0.225
(0.033)










Part Time -1.634 -0.125
(0.431) (0.202)
Female, Married, & Healthy 0.770
(0.244)
Low Wage Hourly Worker 0.625
(0.250)
Manufacturing 1.362 0.356 0.502
(0.281) (0.296) (.125)
R-squared 0.33 0.32 0.25 0.12 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.03
N 304,744          304,744          304,744          328,952           328,952          328,952        323,899           368,230         
Sample Employed Employed Employed Employed Employed Employed Employed All
Notes:
Malpractice payments from National Practitioner Data Bank.
Health Insurance Premiums Instrumented with Malpractice Payments
Labor market outcomes and employer health insurance information from Current Population Survey (March).
Health insurance premiums from Kaiser/HRET survey (state-year data on premiums by policy type and employer size).
Individual-level observations from 1996-2002 Current Population Survey.  Sample limited to those age 22-64.
Premiums assigned based on state, year, family structure (and employer size for employed).
Instruments include real dollar amount and number of medical malpractice payments per capita for different specialties (surgery, ob-gyn, internal medicine, 
Part-time work defined as less than 30 hours per week.  Low wage hourly workers defined as those paid less than $8/hour.  Healthy defined as self-reported 
Employer HI
Table 4:  Differential Effects of Premium Increases
Ln (Wage & Salary Income)
Ln (HI Prem) *(Female, Married, & 
Healthy)
Ln (HI Prem) *Low Wage Hourly 
Worker(1) (2)
Ln (HI Premium) 0.082 -0.381
(.200) (.169)
N 69,120                              10,754                         
Sample All        Hrly Workers
Notes:
Malpractice payments from National Practitioner Data Bank.
Part-time work defined as less than 30 hours per week.
Low wage hourly workers defined as those paid less than $8/hour.
Healthy defined as self-reported health excellent or very good.
Health Insurance Premiums Instrumented with Malpractice Payments
Instruments include real dollar amount and number of medical malpractice 
payments per capita for different specialties (surgery, ob-gyn, internal 
medicine, and other) for current year and previous year.
Table 5:  Health Insurance Offering
Offered Employer Health Insurance
Among Employed
Premiums assigned based on state, year, family structure (and employer size 
for employed).
Individual-level observations from Current Population Survey.  Sample 
limited to those age 22-64 included in both February and March 
Supplements, 1997, 1999, 2001.
Health insurance premiums from Kaiser/HRET survey (state-year data on 
premiums by policy type and employer size).
Labor market outcomes and employer health insurance information from 
Current Population Survey (March and February).Black Female Married Good Health Employer C-section
Pension Overall Cancer Rates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Sample:  All
Ln (HI Premium) -0.014 0.057 -0.015 -0.081 -0.097 0.122 0.001 0.0003 -0.072
 (0.056) (0.067) (0.047) (0.072) (0.090) (0.120) (0.002) (0.0004) (0.144)
           R-squared  0.097 0.076 0.002 0.003 0.108 0.077 0.990 0.091 0.984
           N  447,883               447,883       447,883            447,883            447,883            447,883             240                   206                  240                  
State and Year FEs yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Sample CPS Micro CPS Micro CPS Micro CPS Micro CPS Micro CPS Micro State-year State-year State-year
Notes:
Individual-level observations from 1996-2002 Current Population Survey.  Sample limited to those age 22-64.
Health insurance premiums from Kaiser/HRET survey (state-year data on premiums by policy type and employer size).
Malpractice payments from National Practitioner Data Bank.
Labor market outcomes and employer health insurance information from Current Population Survey (March).
Regressions weighted by March CPS weights, and standard errors clustered at state level.
Mortality Rates
Table 6:  Specification Checks
Instruments include real dollar amount and number of medical malpractice payments per capita for different specialties (surgery, ob-gyn, internal medicine, and other) for current 
year and previous year.
Covariates include race, age, age^2, age^3, marital status, education, gender, and health status, excluding dependent variable.
Premiums assigned based on state, year, family structure (and employer size for employed).
College 
EducationMean Coefficient Effect 
Probability of being employed  (percentage point) 73% -0.155 -3.1%
Probability of working full time, conditional on working (percentage point) 84% -0.186 -3.7%
Average hours per week, conditional on working 41 -0.102 -0.8
Average annual income (insignificant) 33,750                -0.128 -864
41,442                -0.225 -1,865 Average annual income, conditional on working and having employer HI
Table 7:  Effects of 20 Percent Increase in Premiums